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ABSTRACT 
This paper aims to identify drivers of physical capital adjustments in agriculture. It begins with a 
review of some of the most important theories and modelling approaches regarding firms’ adjustments 
of physical capital, ranging from output-based models to more recent approaches that consider 
irreversibility and uncertainty. Thereafter, it is suggested that determinants of physical capital 
adjustments in agriculture can be divided into three main groups, namely drivers related to: i) 
expected (risk-adjusted) profit, ii) expected societal benefits and costs and iii) expected private non-
pecuniary benefits and costs. The discussion that follows focuses on the determinants belonging to the 
first group and covers aspects related to product market conditions, technological conditions, financial 
conditions and the role of firm structure and organization. Furthermore, the role of subjective beliefs is 
emphasized. The main part of this paper is concerned with the demand side of the physical capital 
market and one section also briefly discusses some aspects related to supply of farm assets.  
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1. Introduction 
Physical capital is generally considered as one of the three primary factors of production in 
economic theory, with the other two being labour and land (natural resources). Typical 
examples of physical capital goods agriculture include farm machinery, farm buildings and 
different types of facilities and equipment used in agricultural production. A firm’s stock of 
physical capital is a result of the firm’s current and past investments in physical capital, as 
well as the depreciation of previous investments. Investments in physical capital, or physical 
capital adjustments, may play different roles for the firm and are driven by a large number of 
determinants. In general, a firm’s investment behaviour represents their capital stock 
adjustments as a response to market opportunities and competitive pressures. Particularly in 
agriculture, factors such as family traditions, attachment to land and substitutability and 
complementarily of production factors influence decisions on physical capital adjustments.  
This paper aims to identify the main determinants for adjustments of physical capital used in 
agricultural production. For that purpose, it begins with a review of some of the most 
important theoretical approaches and concepts regarding firms’ adjustments of physical 
capital, ranging from output-based models to approaches that consider irreversibility and 
uncertainty. Investments undertaken in agricultural production are often characterized by 
irreversibility and a large share of sunk costs as re-sale markets for agricultural buildings 
hardly exists. This implies that the new investment theory, which considers irreversibility, 
uncertainty and flexibility, may be especially relevant when analyzing investments in 
agriculture. However, the different investment theories and modelling approaches should 
generally be viewed as complements to each other. Furthermore, physical capital stock 
changes in agriculture have to be seen in relation to other production factors, such as land 
and labour, as they constitute complements as well as substitutes to physical capital. 
Moreover, investment criteria applied by family farms can be expected to not just be based on 
returns to capital but also to household income. 
Physical capital adjustments in agriculture are expected to be driven by a large number of 
determinants and to be influenced by subjective beliefs as well as individual farm strategies. 
In this paper, we suggest that the drivers of physical capital adjustments in agriculture can be 
divided into three main groups, namely; (I) Expected (risk-adjusted) profit, (II) Expected 
societal benefits and costs, and (III) Expected private non-pecuniary benefits and costs. The 
main rational drive of physical capital replacement or adaptation is the expectation of 
sustaining or increasing expected (risk-adjusted) profit from producing a good or providing a 
service. Furthermore, investment in physical capital may be driven by expected societal 
benefits and costs. For example, certain policies may drive investment if they impose specific 
technological regulations, such as for example environmental regulations. Expected private 
non-pecuniary benefits and costs that could drive capital adjustment include for example 
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reputation or organizational legitimacy gained through compliance with higher quality 
standards or environmental regulations. This paper will mainly focus on the determinants 
related to (expected) profit generation, including product market and technological 
conditions, financial conditions (this topic is elaborated in Deliverable 4.3) and factors 
related to firm structure and organization. 
Although this Deliverable is mainly concerned with the demand side of physical capital 
markets, section 4 briefly mentions some theoretical and practical aspects related to supply 
of physical capital goods and other farm assets. In this section, we distinguish between 
mobile and immobile farm assets. Examples of assets belonging to the former group include 
farm machinery and equipment whereas buildings and agricultural land provide examples of 
farm assets belonging to the latter group. Physical capital can generally be considered as a 
complement to land in agricultural production, and a farm’s access to agricultural land will 
therefore influence its investments in physical capital. Therefore, characteristics of the land 
markets in the member states, such as factors related to (imperfect) institutions and 
regulations which are discussed in other deliverables, will influence farms’ physical capital 
adjustments. 
Clearly, the existing literature related to physical capital adjustments, including for example 
the literature on investment theory, capital theory, decision theory and production 
economics, is extensive and this Deliverable is therefore only able to consider a limited 
number of aspects and papers/contributions related to this topic.  
The remainder of the text is structured as follows. The following section defines and 
categorizes physical capital and investments and gives an overview of traditional investment 
criteria. Section 3 reviews some existing theories and modelling approaches related to 
physical capital adjustments and suggest a framework for drivers and demand for physical 
capital adjustments. This is followed by a brief discussion of the supply side of agricultural 
physical capital goods (including land) in section 4. The paper ends with a summary.     
2. Physical capital and investment - definitions and categorizations 
2.1 Definition of physical capital  
Physical capital is generally defined as an asset that is used in production and which is 
manufactured by humans. The latter characteristic means that it is reproducible. It may be 
for example machinery, buildings or vehicles. It is different from other types of capital such 
as human or financial, which is indicated by the word “physical”.1 Physical capital sometimes 
refers to fixed capital, but definition will not be used in this paper. The standard definition of 
physical capital thus excludes non-reproducible production factors such as land.  
2.2 Categorization of physical capital and other assets used in 
production 
Physical capital goods used in (agricultural) production can often be classified as machinery, 
equipment or buildings. Examples of farm machinery include tractors, ploughs and 
combines. Farm equipment may be exemplified by milking machines and fences. Barns, silos 
and different types of storage provide examples of agricultural buildings. 
Assets used in production, including physical capital, can be categorized according to its 
(physical) properties and characteristics in the production process. Table 1 provides an 
overview of some categorizations concerning production assets’ tangibility, durability, 
mobility and reproducibility. The last column indicates whether assets belonging to the 
specific category can be labelled as physical capital according to its general definition (“an 
asset used in production and manufactured by humans”).  
                                                        
1 Deardorff's Glossary of International Economics. 
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Table 1. Categorization of assets used in production. 
Categorization Definition 
Examples relevant for 
agricultural 
production 
Assets in this category 
can be (but are not 
necessarily) labelled as 
physical capital 
according to its 
standard definition† 
Tangibility††    
Tangible An asset whose value 
depends on certain 
physical properties. It 
has a physical form. 
Buildings, machinery,  
different types of 
facilities  and 
equipment used in 
agricultural 
production 
Yes  
Intangible An asset that do not 
have a physical form. 
Human capital, 
managerial skills 
No 
Durability†††    
Durable (fixed) An asset used 
repeatedly over several 
production periods 
Buildings, machinery, 
different types of 
facilities and 
equipment used in 
agricultural 
production 
Yes 
Non-durable (variable) An asset used within 
the current production 
period 
Seed, fertilizers, 
pesticides 
Yes 
Mobility    
Mobile An asset that does not 
have a fixed 
localization (can be 
moved). 
Machinery, equipment Yes 
Immobile An asset that has a 
fixed localization 
(cannot easily be 
moved). 
Land, buildings, 
facilities that cannot 
(easily) be moved 
Yes 
Reproducibility††††    
Reproducible A tangible asset that 
can be matched or 
duplicated 
Buildings, machinery, 
equipment, different 
types of facilities and 
equipment used in 
agricultural 
production 
Yes 
Non-reproducible A tangible asset that 
cannot be reproduced 
(i.e. it is unique) 
Land No 
† By standard definition we refer to the definition: “An asset used in production and manufactured by 
humans”, ††Investiopedia.com, ††† Following Johnson and Quance (1972), †††† Encyclo Online 
Encyclopedia  
Source: own compilation. 
Assets can be either tangible or intangible depending on whether they have a physical 
substance and can “be seen”, in which case they belong to the category “tangible assets”. 
Physical capital is thus a tangible asset. Intangible assets, which do not have a physical 
substance and may be difficult to value, include firm assets such as patents, human capital 
and managerial skills.   
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Another categorisation of production assets refers to their durability. That is, it has to do with 
the duration in the use of assets. If they are used shortly after they have been acquired (which 
in agricultural production is relevant for variable inputs such as fertilizers, pesticides and 
seeds), they belong to the group of non-durable assets. Durable assets, on the other hand, can 
be used over several time periods and examples relevant for agricultural production include 
assets such as machinery and buildings. 
The third categorization in Table 1 concerns the mobility of assets. That is, whether an asset 
is possible move or if it is fixed to a certain geographical location. Agricultural land 
constitutes an example of an immobile production factor used in agriculture.  
The last categorization mentioned here refers to the reproducibility of assets.  Reproducible 
tangible assets include assets that can be matched or duplicated (e.g. machinery) whereas 
non-reproducible assets cannot be reproduced (e.g. land).  
2.3 Definition of investment  
Investments may be undertaken by private individuals, private firms, or governments. They 
represent a flow of expenditures that are to increase or sustain capital stock. More precisely, 
an investment is a flow of expenditures that are assigned to projects, realization of which 
does not constitute an immediate consumption. These investment projects can increase 
physical and human capital, as well as (material) stock (Pearce et al., 1992). Another, slightly 
simplified, way of defining investment is to say that it refers to the “production of goods that 
will be used to produce other goods” (Hassett, 2011). It should be noted that the definition of 
investment used in economics differs from the definition used in finance, where it refers to 
the purchase of financial assets such as stocks or bonds.  
As already noted, an investment does not have to be in the form of privately owned physical 
goods; it can also be of nonphysical character such as investments in human capital. 
Education and trainings provide examples of human capital investments. Because this 
Deliverable is concerned with physical capital, the remainder of our discussion will be limited 
to investments in physical capital.     
Investments by private individuals, private firms, or governments may be financed either by 
savings (i.e. forgone consumption) or through loans. An important difference between these 
two ways of financing investments are that in the latter case, some of the future returns to 
capital must be used for the cost of lending. Efficient investment composes of projects 
changing the current state of firm capital endowment which has a positive net present value 
(principle of marginal return on capital), or projects with internal rate of return larger than 
interest rate (Pearce et al., 1992).  
2.4 Types of investment  
Investments are carried out for different purposes and play different roles for the individual 
firm. It is therefore meaningful to differentiate between different types of investments. A 
replacement investment is an investment carried in order to replace a (technically) 
depreciated asset that has been and will be used in the firm’s production. Its purpose is (at a 
steady state level) to maintain current levels of profits (Nwaeze, 2005). An adaptation 
investment, on the other hand, is carried out in order to adopt the production to, e.g., a new 
technology or to modernize the production. In opposite to replacement investments it is 
thereby expected to affect the firms’ value (see for example Nwaeze, 2005). Gross investment 
equals the sum of reinvestment (replacement investment) and net investment (modernizing 
investment or rationalizing investment).  
A start-up investment is carried out for starting-up a business, for example as a response to 
new product demand or filling in a market niche with an innovative product/service. 
Investments may also be competition/technology driven (efficiency advantage of adopting 
DRIVERS OF AGRICULTURAL PHYSICAL CAPITAL DEVELOPMENT | 5 
newest technologies) or carried out in order to expand current production2 (for example to 
achieve scale advantages), diversify production (to achieve scope advantages), or need to 
restructure current production (to increase organizational efficiency). 
2.5 Traditional investment evaluation criteria 
In order to decide whether an investment is to be undertaken or not and/or to compare the 
profitability among different investment options, a number of different decision rules (or 
investment evaluation criteria) exist. The traditional investment criteria typically consider 
the future expected cash flows caused by the investment, the cost of investment and /or the 
firm’s cost of capital (required rate of return).  
Three of the traditional investment criteria are the Net Present Value (NPV), Return on 
capital (ROC) and the Internal Rate of Return (IRR). The NPV of an investment is the 
discounted future cash flows of the project subtracted by the investment costs. According to 
this investment rule, an investment is profitable if the net present value is non-negative. The 
higher the NPV, the more profitable is the investment. Formally, the NPV can be written as 
∑
=
−+=
T
t
t
t C
r
CNPV
1
0)1(
 
where t is the time of the cash flow, r is the discount rate/rate of return/interest rate, Ct is the 
net cash flow at time t and C0 is the investment cost undertaken at t=0.  
ROC is the ratio of the (after tax) income by the book value of invested capital. A ratio higher 
than one thus indicates a profitable investment. The IRR is the discount rate that 
corresponds to the net present value of all cash flows related to an investment (if investment 
cost is considered as a negative cash flow) equal to zero. This method can thus be used to 
compare the profitability among different projects and a higher IRR implies a higher 
profitability of the project.  
On a theoretical level, the existence several investment criteria - and not only one “universal” 
- has sometimes been emphasized as a weakness of capital theory. For example, Jorgenson 
(1967) pointed out that investment criteria such as ROC and IRR are inconsistent with utility 
maximization and argued that the only criterion consistent with utility maximization is 
maximization of the present value of the firm.    
Another limitation of the above mentioned traditional methods for investment evaluation are 
that they do not consider any form of uncertainty or risk connected to the returns of the 
project. Moreover, they consider any investment decision as a “now-or-never”-decision. In 
most real investment situations, the decision maker has the option to “wait-and-see” as more 
information about the uncertainty in returns becomes available. This option is especially 
important when the investment is (at least partly) irreversible as flexibility in the timing of 
the investment then has a value. The value of flexibility is the focus of the new investment 
theory (the Real Options Approach) which is discussed in section 3.1.9.    
A further limitation of the traditional investment criteria is that they do not account for any 
strategic values considering competitive interactions. Current investments may interact with 
future investments, be in conflict with future strategic advantages, or may be affected 
by/affect actions of external parties (Smit and Trigerios, 2004).3  
When both flexibility and strategic values are considered, the expanded NPV consists of three 
parts and can be written as:4 
                                                        
2 See for example Eisner (1972). 
3 Smit and Trigerios (2004) provide an overview of investment evaluation methods that consider these 
aspects, making use of real options theory and game theory. 
4 Figure 1.3 in Smit and Trigerios, 2004. 
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Expanded (strategic) NPV = (passive) NPV + flexibility (option) value + strategic (game-
theoretic) value 
Specifically in agriculture, any change in the capital stock has to be seen in relation to other 
production factors, such as land and labour which can be seen as complements as well as 
substitutes to physical capital. This is of particular relevance for family farms with a close 
links between farm and household. Accordingly, investment criteria applied by family farms 
can be expected to not just be based on the returns to capital but also to household income. 
3. Demand for physical capital 
3.1 Theories and modelling approaches related to physical capital 
adjustment  
A wide range of approaches aiming to model physical capital adjustments have been 
suggested in the literature, ranging from models that preceded the neoclassical models (e.g. 
the accelerator and liquidity theories of investment) to more recent approaches that consider 
uncertainty and irreversibility (e.g. the real options approach). The neoclassical investment 
theory basis its analysis on the assumptions typically made in neoclassical economics, e.g. 
those of fully informed rational agents and maximization of (expected) utility, firm profit or 
firm market value. Neoclassical investment models, such as Jorgenson’s model, typically 
assume that perfect resale markets exist. From the neoclassical view, an investment decision 
is thus riskless and irreversible. Furthermore, capital stock adjustments are assumed to be 
driven only by the returns on investment projects and the firms' investment decisions are 
assumed to be separable from other factors such as financial decisions within the firm. More 
recent investment models also consider uncertainty in returns from and irreversibility of the 
investment decision. Although adopting assumptions that are more plausible in many real 
investment situations, not at least in the case of farm investments, the quality of empirical 
applications of these approaches is of course highly dependent on the quality of available 
empirical data. 
The various existing theories and approaches for modelling investment behaviour are 
typically concerned with one or a few determinants and can therefore often be viewed as 
complements to each other. Table 2 gives an overview of determinants considered by 
different theories and models. In the following subsections a brief overview of the following 
groups of investment models/theories is provided;  Accelerator models (section 3.1.1), 
Liquidity theory (section 3.1.2), Neoclassical investment models (section 3.1.3), the Q theory 
of investment (section 3.1.4), Information theories of investment (section 3.1.5), Agency 
theory (section 3.1.6), Euler equations (section 3.1.7), theories that consider asset 
complementarity, sunk cost and specificity of assets (section 3.1.8), Real option theory 
(section 3.1.9), and theories and models related to technology, adoption and diffusion 
(section 3.1.10). Our brief review does generally not report the formal (mathematical) 
representations of the investment models/theories. Instead, it focuses on the main 
assumptions and their implications. The theoretical literature has also been concerned with 
the role of subjective beliefs in decision making, which is briefly discussed in section 3.1.11. 
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Table 2. Overview of some existing theories and modelling approaches related to 
investment behaviour 
Determinants Group of model/theory (section) Authors (examples) 
 Accelerator models (section 3.1.1)  
Rate of growth of demand 
or output 
Accelerator model  Clark (1917), Chenery 
(1952), Koyck (1954) 
Revised accelerator model 
e.g. Eisner and Strotz 
(1963) 
Profitability (size) 
Liquidity theory (section 3.1.2)  
Liquidity theory (residual funds, future 
profitability) 
Dusenberry (1958), Meyer 
and Kuh (1957), Kuh (1963) 
Liquidity theory (financing hierarchy) Koch (1943), Donaldson 
(1961) 
 
Neoclassical investment models 
(section 3.1.3)  
Cost of capital (taxes, 
interest rate) 
Neoclassical model (investment and 
financial decisions separate) 
Jorgenson et al. (1963, 
1966, 1967, 1971), 
Jorgenson and Siebert 
(1968) 
Relative prices of capital 
services 
Modified neoclassical model (putty-clay 
approach) 
Bischoff (1971) 
Firm market value,  
Capital replacement cost 
The Q-theory of investment (section 
3.1.4) 
Brainard and Tobin (1968), 
Tobin (1969) 
Information asymmetry,  
Credit rationing 
Information theories of 
investment (section 3.1.5) 
Stiglitz and Weiß (1981), 
Greenwald et al. (1984), 
Myers and Majluff (1984)  
Information asymmetry, 
Managerial preferences Agency theory (section 3.1.6) 
Jensen and Meckling 
(1976), Holmström (1979) 
Adjustment costs Euler equations (section 3.1.7) Hayashi (1982) 
 
Theories that consider asset 
complementarity, sunk costs and 
specificity of assets (section 3.1.8) 
 
Complementarity of 
assets, sunk costs, asset 
specificity 
Fixed assets theory 
Johnson (1956), Johnson 
and Quance (1972), 
Balmann et al. (1996) 
Relation-specificity of 
investments The hold-up problem, opportunism 
Tirole (1988), Williamson 
(1975) 
Uncertainty, 
Irreversibility of 
investment 
Real option theory (section 3.1.9) 
Henry (1974), McDonald 
and Siegel (1986), Pindyck 
(1991), Dixit and Pindyck 
(1994) 
 
Theories and models related to 
technology, adoption and diffusion 
(section 3.1.10) 
 
Firm size, Human capital, 
Time of technology use 
The threshold model of technology and 
adoption 
David (1969) 
Distance and geography 
(travel and transport 
cost) 
Innovation geography (technology 
adoption and diffusion) Rogers (1962) 
Output prices, Elasticity 
of demand 
The treadmill model (technology 
adoption and diffusion) 
Cochrane (1979) 
Source: own compilation. 
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3.1.1 Accelerator models  
This group of models was originally suggested by Clark (1917) and has been modified and 
revised by a number of authors including Chenery (1952), Koyck (1954), and Eisner et al. (e.g. 
1963). The accelerator models are based on the assumption that the “desired” capital stock is 
proportional to the output in the same time period, i.e. Kd = αY, where Kd is the desired 
capital stock, Y is the output and α is a constant. This basic formulation uses “desired capital” 
instead of capital as it is assumed that the capital stock cannot immediately be adjusted to 
changes in output. The slow reaction on capital is also considered in the so-called flexible 
accelerator models which generally assume that capital stock changes (investments) can 
occur over several time periods. A popular flexible accelerator model is the one suggested by 
Eisner and Strotz (1963) who assume the presence of adjustments costs when the actual 
capital stock deviates from the desired.   
3.1.2 Liquidity theory 
The liquidity theory of investment (e.g. Meyer and Kuh, 1957; Dusenberry, 1958; Kuh, 1963) 
assumes that the desired capital is proportional to liquidity. Thus, this theory replaces output 
in the accelerator models with a measure of the firm’s liquidity. As noted by Samuel (1996), 
the replacement of output by liquidity was motivated by at least to reasons. The first is that 
actual realized profits are a measure expected profits, and profit expectations governs 
investment, and the second is that supply of funds constrains a firms investments.    
3.1.3 Neoclassical investment models 
The original investment model suggested by Jorgenson (1963) is output-based and the 
desired capital stock is assumed to be a linear function of output. It adopts neoclassical 
assumptions such as a perfect competitive market and the production technology is 
represented by a Cobb-Douglas production function. Unlike the preceding accelerator 
models, Jorgensen’s model assumed that investment is a function of price of capital, in 
addition to output. Several variants of Jorgensen’s original model have been suggested 
including the modified model by Bischoff (1971) which relaxed the assumption about a 
symmetric relation between output and the rental price. 
3.1.4 The Q theory of investment 
The Q models of investments (e.g. Brainard and Tobin, 1968; Tobin, 1969) differ from the 
preceding investment models such as the accelerator models and Jorgenson’s model in that 
they are not output-based. Investment is thus not viewed as a function of output as in the 
previous models, but instead assumed to be determined by the firm’s market value. As noted 
by Clark (1979), the Q models should therefore not be viewed as complements but rather 
substitutes to the standard neoclassical models. They are based on the assumption of convex 
adjustment costs.  
3.1.5 Information theories of investment 
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) argued that the price of credit (the interest rate) is not necessarily at 
a level that equilibrates the market, which the law of supply and demand would predict under 
perfect information. They explained this by the fact that credit markets are characterized by 
imperfect information which leads to credit rationing. In a joint paper with Greenwald 
(Greenwald et al., 1984), they further argued that it is not the price of credit but the credit 
availability that affects firms’ investments and that the effective cost of capital can affect 
investments also on firms that are not credit constrained.    
Myers and Majluff (1984) analyzed the case when the firm managers have information that 
the investors don’t have and develop a model that shows that, under asymmetric knowledge 
of managers and investors, firms may pass up profitable investment opportunities as they 
may refuse to issue stock.  
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3.1.6 Agency theory  
Agency theory (e.g. Holmström, 1979; Jensen and Meckling, 1976) is concerned with 
incentive problems within the firm, which are suggested to affect firms’ investment 
behaviour. One strand of the agency theory literature is concerned with the so-called 
principal-agent problem (e. g. Holmström, 1979) that arises when asymmetric information is 
present when a contract is established between two or more parties. The parties typically 
consist of a “principal” who has delegated work to one or several “agents”. The theory 
separate between two types of problems caused by information asymmetry between the 
parties. The first, which is usually called the moral hazard problem, refers to the problem that 
arises when the principal cannot fully observe the activities (effort) of the agent and the goal 
functions of the two parties differ. The second type of problem refers to the unobservability of 
“types”, e.g. when a manager is not able to separate high-productive workers from low-
productive workers (adverse selection).  
Jensen and Meckling (1976) defined agency costs as the sum of the monitoring expenditures 
by the principal, the bonding expenditures by the agent, and the residual loss. In the 
corporate finance literature, agency costs are assumed to affect the relation between the 
manager (the agent) and the stockholders (the principal). With the help of agency costs, 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) showed that a firm manager in a firm with a capital structure 
consisting partly of debt will choose a set of activities that do not maximize the firm’s value.  
3.1.7 Euler equations   
Euler equations are a group of dynamic investment models and originate from the work of 
Hayashi (1982). They have an explicit structural interpretation and are derived from dynamic 
models under rational expectations, and are therefore more theoretically appealing compared 
to traditional models of investment (see for example Oliner et al., 1995).  
Euler investment equations are derived from the same underlying model as Q models and 
are, like Q models, based on the assumption of convex adjustment costs. A crucial difference 
between the two modelling approaches is however that Q models incorporate the shadow 
price of capital exogenously into the firm's dynamic optimization problem whereas Euler 
equations do not require information on the shadow value of the firm's capital stock. Euler 
equations may thus be more appealing for those countries where financial information is 
insufficient. A further difference is that Euler equations allow relaxing the assumption of 
perfectly competitive markets which is assumed in the Q models. 
3.1.8 Theories that consider asset complementarity, sunk costs and specificity of 
assets 
Farm investment behaviour has also been studied by assuming that farm investment affects 
the output level not only directly but also indirectly though the use of complementary inputs 
(Johnson, 1956; Johnson and Quance, 1972). Agricultural production is often characterized 
by large irreversible investments. For example, agricultural buildings can often be considered 
as sunk cost as they usually do not have any other use and a re-sale market for buildings 
hardly exist. The presence of sunk investment costs implies that after the investment decision 
is made, the opportunity costs are lower than before (i.e. the investment decision caused 
sunk costs). Balmann et al. (1996) show that sunk costs of an asset do not only create asset 
specificity, and thus affect the future use of this asset, but may also cause further investments 
into complementary assets which would not occur without the sunk costs of the first asset. 
These interdependencies affect the shadow prices of production factors in a similar way, 
though sometimes in opposite directions, as productivity and output prices. 
The literature has also dealt with the issue of relation-specificity of assets which arises when 
one party in a relationship (vertical or horizontal) has to make an investment that has a lower 
value for the firm outside that specific relationship. This implies that, when the investment is 
undertaken, the other party may exploit the situation by demanding a higher share of the 
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profits generated by the investment. The problem is thus that the fear of this kind of 
situation, by the party who has to make the investment, may lead to that otherwise Pareto 
optimal investments are not conducted. The hold-up problem was formalized by Tirole 
(1988) but was also discussed by Williamson (e.g. 1975) who used term “opportunism” when 
talking about this phenomenon.  
3.1.9 Real options theory 
Studies based on the real option model of Dixit and Pindyck (1994) consider uncertainty and 
irreversibility of firm investments. In these studies, sunk costs are accounted for ex ante for 
decision making. The real options approach suggests that a firm, being uncertain about the 
future and knowing that it might be hard to re-sell capital, may benefit from waiting with an 
investment activity. If the gains of waiting exceed the costs of waiting, it may be better to 
postpone investment. Thus, according to the real options approach, irreversible investment 
decisions under uncertainty should consider the opportunity costs of deferring the 
investment decision in order to obtain improved information about the involved risks 
(Henry, 1974; McDonald and Siegel, 1986; Pindyck, 1991; Leahy, 1993). According to this 
approach, the investment decision can be interpreted as an optimal stopping problem. The 
formal representation of this model can be found in Dixit and Pindyck (1994).  
It was shown by Odening et al. (2005; 2007) that the outcomes of real options applications 
are sensitive to assumptions about type and measurement of the underlying uncertainty. This 
implies that it is important to have an accurate understanding of the underlying dynamics of 
the stochastic variable (e.g. price) when applying the real options method. A further 
constraint for empirical applications of this approach is that detailed and reliable information 
about the (volatility of) project returns must be available. 
3.1.10 Theories and models related to technology, diffusion and adaption 
This subsection will very briefly mention some of the existing theories and models related to 
technology, diffusion and adaption. A threshold model of technology adoption and diffusion 
of farm equipment was introduced by David (1969). He derived the minimum farm size 
required for adoption was while assuming that farm size is the main source of heterogeneity 
(Sundling and Zilbermann, 2000). In the book “Diffusion of Innovations”, Rogers (1962) 
summarized exiting research on diffusion of innovations and proposed a theory for the 
adoption of innovation. This theory aims to explain the diffusion of innovations. Rogers 
suggested that the diffusion of a new idea is influenced by the innovation, communication 
channels, time, and a social system.  
Cochrane’s treadmill (Cochrane, 1958) suggests that farmers continuously aim to adapt the 
newest technologies in order to be prepared for declining prices. The idea is that early 
adopters of a new technology, which enables them to produce larger quantities at lower unit 
costs, will temporarily make profits. However, since the increasing number of adopters of the 
new technology contributes to an increasing supply, the market price is declining. The 
farmers who have not yet adopted the technology are then forced to do so in order to survive.  
3.1.11 Subjective beliefs and decision making 
In addition to the determinants considered by the above reviewed theories and models 
related to investment behaviour, a firm’s decisions about physical capital adjustments are 
likely to also be affected by subjective beliefs and subjective probabilities for project returns. 
This might be especially relevant for investment projects associated with “Knightian” types of 
uncertainties5 (seen from an objective perspective). When the returns of a project are 
unknown, firms make their investment decisions according to subjective beliefs rather than 
                                                        
5 In his classical work from 1921, Frank Knight made a distinguishing between measurable uncertainty 
(risk) and un-measurable uncertainty, often referred to as “Knightian uncertainty”.  
DRIVERS OF AGRICULTURAL PHYSICAL CAPITAL DEVELOPMENT | 11 
well-defined probabilities.6 The subjective beliefs may change when the decision maker get 
access to new relevant information. These ideas are thus related to the Bayesian approach of 
probability updating.  
The impact of subjective beliefs on decision making has been recognized in the theoretical 
literature. Several authors have identified that the traditional models for decision making are 
not able to deal with the type of situations where well-defined probabilities are not available.7 
For example, Runge (2000) noted that “Uncertainty over future value, coupled with limited 
market structures to serve as benchmarks for value, means that privately arrived at and 
understood subjective value informs decision-making far more than the calculus of simple 
neoclassical choice suggests” (page 1). To overcome this shortcoming of standard approaches 
of modelling decision making, alternative theoretical approaches and analytical tools have 
been proposed. For example, Grant and Quiggin (2007) suggest a model of choice under 
uncertainty in which they assume that individuals do not have a complete description of the 
space of states of the world. The authors make use of decisions trees and describe knowledge 
in terms of a finite set of propositions.   
Several experimental studies have found that the subjective values of the outcomes and their 
subjective probabilities play a central role in decision making (see for example Huber, 2007). 
However, Huber noted that, because of the design of these experiments (typically based on 
gambles), one cannot generalize the results to all decision situations. Huber found that, in 
quasi-realistic risky tasks, decision makers have low interest in probability information 
compared to gambling situations, and that risk-defusing operators (the search for additional 
actions when an alternative leads to a negative outcome) play a crucial role for decision 
makers. 
3.2 Drivers and determinants of demand for physical capital - 
discussion and hypotheses 
A common denominator for most of the theories reviewed in section 3.1 is the main economic 
underlying principle, such as maximization of expected profit (or an alternative income), 
value of the firm or managerial utility. These may thus be perceived as the main drivers of the 
firm’s demand for physical capital. In this section, we will re-group the determinants in Table 
2 which influence these objective variables into more unifying categories of determinants of 
physical capital adjustment. 
Let us first assume that maximization of expected profit is the main economic underlying 
principle. Then, in the case of deterministic revenues and costs, a change in the firm's stock 
of physical capital is, similarly to any other business related decision, primarily subject to 
profit maximization. In a business environment characterized by non-deterministic profits, 
with for example stochastic output levels and prices (which is typically the case, particularly 
in agriculture), a risk averse manager decide on changes in the physical capital stock based 
on maximization of a risk-adjusted profit (i.e. profit subtracted by a risk premium, where the 
size of the risk premium depend on the level of risk aversion). The main rational drive of 
physical capital replacement or adaptation is thus the expectation of sustaining or increasing 
expected (risk-adjusted) profit from producing a good or providing a service in dynamic 
conditions of market competition. Product market dynamics, representing market growth or 
diversification potentials of increasing income, and technological potentials of reducing costs 
of production, together with cost of financing as well as factors related to firm structure and 
organization, determine the final demand for physical capital adaptation and adjustment. To 
                                                        
6 It should here be noted that there has been a discussion of how relevant Knightian uncertainty really 
is. For example, Ellsberg (1961) noted that in situations characterized by Knightian uncertainty, people 
tend to act “as if” they had assigned numerical probabilities or “degree of belief” to the outcome of an 
action.  
7 It should here be noted that the ideas of subjective probabilities and the use of Bayesian probability 
theory are not new in decision theory and were put forward by Leonard Savage already in the 1950’s. 
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understand the demand for agricultural physical capital, the specifics of the agricultural 
product market, technological possibilities affected by characteristics of agricultural 
production (e.g., economies of scale and scope, complementarity and substitutability of 
inputs, etc.) as well as agricultural sector-specific conditions of capital financing must be 
considered.  
Expected private non-pecuniary benefits and costs may also drive capital adjustment. These 
include for example reputation or organizational legitimacy gained through compliance with 
higher quality standards or environmental regulations, or through being among the first 
adopters of a new technology (which may increase prestige of the producer and possibly 
social standing). The last mentioned aspects may also represent a strategy of increasing 
profits and reducing income volatility. It could further increase consumers' awareness of the 
firm and lead to consumers' preferences of its products, and thereby increase the sales and 
income (and possibly also attract external investors). Such behaviours could vary across 
regions and especially across member states with mature and transition economies, as it 
likely is determined by the level entrepreneurship skills or culture and tradition that reflects 
in consumers responsiveness to producers behaviour and establishment of reputation or 
organizational legitimacy. 
The final effects of the determinants related to the drivers discussed above are likely to be 
influenced by subjective beliefs as well as individual firm strategies. Subjective beliefs may be 
especially relevant for investments driven by innovations and entrepreneurial activities, as 
the economic payoff and income volatility reduction related to those activities often are more 
or less unknown. For example, innovative firms adopt new technologies before its technical 
efficiency effects are known or tested. The firms’ decisions are then affected by beliefs, 
personality traits and corporate culture.    
Investment in physical capital may further be driven by firms' external incentives and 
impositions that affect the expected societal benefits and costs. Particularly, certain policies 
may drive investment if they impose specific technological regulations, such as for example 
environmental regulations. Policies that involve subsidizing adoption and the use of certain 
technologies (such as organic production methods) imply that affect physical capital 
adjustments are adjusted through the expected profit determinants. Another example is 
insecurity in land tenure (e.g. short term leasing) that has been found to affect (reduce) 
investments in agriculture (e.g. Koester and Brooks, 1997). 
Figure 1 illustrates a system of drivers and determinants of physical capital adjustment 
(beyond pure capital replacement) which considers the three groups of drivers and 
determinants discussed above. The impact of subjective beliefs is represented in the figure by 
a filter that adjusts the effect of the determinants.   
The following sections will mainly elaborate on the determinants of expected profit 
generation from adjustment of (investment in) physical capital – product market conditions, 
technological conditions, financial conditions, and firm structure and organization. 
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Figure 1. System of main drivers and determinants of firm physical capital adjustment 
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3.2.1 Product market conditions  
The income increasing potential of investment depends on product market characteristics 
such as demand for new agricultural products and new market dynamics, position in 
value/supply chain, product market price stability/volatility, stability and flexibility of 
product market institutions and future of the agricultural product market. 
Demand for new agricultural products in creates new market dynamics in the form of new 
markets, new product developments and product substitutability. These characteristics are 
however less relevant for producers of conventional agricultural products (as within the 
supply chain, agriculture produces the "raw" product). In general, agriculture with low 
elasticity of demand and lower scope for product innovation has relatively lower market 
increase potential than other sectors. However, agricultural policy also increases consumers' 
protection and awareness and hence the demand for products with new attributes relating to 
quality and brand names (both allowing for price premiums). These trends require 
adjustment in physical capital. 
Moreover, a desired position in value/supply chain can represent an important impediment 
to investment. Agricultural producers (farmers) are typically characterized by relatively low 
bargaining power which implies relatively higher bargaining costs. This creates a need for 
contractual and organizational solutions and implies a more centralized food industry which 
lowers returns on capital (investment) for agricultural producers when compared to other 
sectors. 
Investment behaviour is further determined by product market price stability/volatility. 
Price volatilities arise as a result of for example weather, seasonality of production and world 
trade effects. Changes in regional yields and changes in product use (from food to energy) 
and demand may results in price risk that lowers and/or postpones investment.   
Other determinants of farm investment activities relate to stability and flexibility of product 
market institutions. Lack of factors such as protection of property rights, bankruptcy law, 
contractual reinforcement and flexibility in creating new institutions for new market 
demands (quality standardization) creates market transaction costs which might result in 
differences in investment activity between farm types, between new and old EU member 
states and in particular differences to candidate countries. 
Farm investments are also likely influenced by the future of the agricultural product market. 
Foreseen changes in trade and sectoral policies create uncertainties which cause differences 
in investment activity over time as well as differences between different economic systems 
(member states and candidate countries). 
3.2.2 Technological conditions  
Physical capital adjustments further depend on the potentials of technological adjustment in 
reducing unit cost as well as the development of existing physical capital. Technological 
potentials and impediments include aspects such as productivity and quality effects of new 
technologies, economies of scale and scope, asset specificity, substitutability and 
complementarity of inputs, timing of investment, timeliness costs and capital development 
(depreciation). 
Productivity and quality effects of new technologies may drive investments as they may 
allow the farmer to produce at a lower unit cost and/or allow for higher quality of the product 
and thereby potential higher returns.   
Physical capital adjustment may also be driven by the goal to reduce unit cost of production 
by adjusting the optimal scale of production, i.e. economies of scale are driving the 
investment. A firm is producing at the lowest average unit cost when it is producing at its 
“optimal scale”, i.e. when it is producing at a constant return to scale. When it is producing at 
increasing returns to scale, it can expand all inputs to achieve lower average unit costs, and 
when it is producing at decreasing returns to scale, it can reduce all inputs to achieve a lower 
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average unit cost. Physical capital adjustments may thus be a way to adjust to the optimal 
scale of production.  
Another factor expected to influence investments by farms relates to the concept of 
economies of scope, i.e. cost reductions that can be achieved when producing two or more 
outputs. Economies of scope exist when the joint production of, say, products A and B can be 
done at a lower average cost compared to the case when A and B are produced separately. 
Agricultural production provides many examples of economies of scope, such as the 
complementarity between agricultural production and the provision of ecosystem services 
(e.g. Wossink and Swinton, 2007).      
Many investments in physical capital in agricultural production are characterized by asset 
specificity. That is, they are only or mainly useful for one specific purpose and cannot easy be 
re-sold. These types of assets are therefore often characterized by large shares of sunk costs 
and this characteristic can, according to some of the theories reviewed in section 3.1, affect 
the firm’s investment behaviour and for example cause investments in complementary assets. 
In general, complementarity as well as substitutability of production inputs influences 
physical capital adjustments.   
The timing of technology adaption (early versus later adaption) may create comparative 
advantage of technological innovation in condition of inelastic demand (such as in 
agriculture). Bad timing may result in Cochrane treadmill, that is, it lowers returns on 
capital/investment over time faster than in sectors with higher elasticity of demand. 
Physical capital adjustment may also be a way to optimize the size of the machinery park 
subject to minimizing timeliness costs. Timeliness cost (e.g. Edwards and Boehle, 1980; 
Short and Gitu, 1991) refers to the fact that it may be costly for the farmer if a field operation 
cannot be performed at the optimal point in time. For example, delayed harvesting may 
imply a poorer quality of the crop and thereby lower return for the farmer. The size of the 
timeliness cost depends on several factors such as soil quality, type of crop and type of field 
operation.  
Investments, in particular replacement investments, are also a result of depreciation of 
capital. Depreciation is caused by both physical and functional factors. Physical depreciation 
relates to the actual use of an investment whereas functional depreciation is caused by factors 
such as technological advances and reduced demand for a product. The depreciation thus 
reflects the decline of usefulness of an asset. The depreciation costs are determined by the 
initial cost, the useful life of the asset and the residual value.  
3.2.3 Financial conditions  
Investment decisions are influenced by the cost of investment among which cost of financing 
play an important role. This relates to the functioning of the financial capital market which is 
a topic covered by Deliverable 4.3 and will only briefly be discussed below.  
Modigliani and Miller (1958) suggested that a firm’s capital structure is irrelevant for its 
value (the Modigliani-Miller theorem). The Modigliani-Miller theorem thus implies that a 
firm’s investment decisions are independent from its financing decisions. However, external 
and internal financing are usually not perfect substitutes (as external finance is usually more 
expensive). In the finance literature, this has been explained as a result of asymmetric 
information leading to problems caused by adverse selection (e.g. Myers and Majluf, 1984) 
and moral hazard (e.g. Jensen and Meckling, 1976).     
Several studies provide empirical evidence for the idea that firm capital structure (liquidity) 
affects accessibility to credit and investment. For example, Fazzari el al. (1988) finds that 
liquidity has a positive impact on investment. However, the difficulties of empirically 
assessing the impact of financial constraints on investments have also been highlighted in the 
literature. Schiantarelli (1996) provides a critical review of the econometrical evidence and a 
discussion of various methodological issues. 
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The accessibility and cost (including transaction costs) of credits in agriculture largely varies 
among countries, regions and individual firms within the member states. One reason is 
imperfections on the agricultural credit market which are mainly due to imperfect 
(asymmetric) information.8 Because of such imperfections, not all farmers are able to get 
access to credits even in cases when investment would have been profitable. Imperfect 
information on the agricultural credit market may also cause moral hazard problems if the 
loan applicant does not have enough incentives to carry out profitable investment projects or 
does not act (invest) according to the initial purpose of the loan (Swinnen and Gow, 1999). 
In order to mitigate the problem of credit constraints in agriculture, governments have 
intervened the market through for example credit interest subsidies and credit guaranties. 
Agricultural credit institutions have also been initiated. An advantage of these is that they are 
equipped with the special knowledge relevant for agricultural activities and thereby are able 
to reduce the problems related to asymmetric information (Swinnen and Gow, 1999). 
However, in the case of transitional economies, Swinnen and Gow (1999) conclude that low 
farm productivity is a critical factor behind the agricultural and rural finance problems and 
that intervention on the agricultural credit markets therefore is not enough to solve the 
problems in those countries.    
3.2.4 Firm structure and organization  
Farm ownership structure, which significantly varies across the member states, may explain 
some differences in regional investment behaviour. There is an extensive amount of 
theoretical and empirical literature dealing with the potential impact of ownership and 
organizational structure and governance on corporate value and/or investment behaviour. As 
we saw in section 3.1.6, Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggested that ownership structure 
affects investment (which in turn affects corporate value). Also several empirical studies have 
looked at the impact of ownership structure on investments, an often finds that ownership 
structure influences investment (e.g. Cho, 1998). However, empirical analyses of the impact 
of ownership structure on investments are often complicated by endogeneity of the 
ownership variable.    
Complexity in organizational structures, dispersion in ownership and delegation of control 
are examples of ownership/organizational factors that may determine investment 
behaviours. For example, some innovative technologies have the potential to simplify the 
production process (e.g. GM crops) which may reduce technical inefficiencies in complex 
organizations. Therefore, they may be preferred in firms with complex organizational 
structure. Firms with dispersed ownership structure provide scope for managerial discretion, 
i.e., high agency costs. To avoid increase in agency costs, owners might prefer less complex 
investment projects. The effect of ownership structure on investment is further likely to 
depend on the institutional framework for corporate governance, e.g., protection of property 
rights, protection of minority owner and functioning of equity markets. Thus, a general 
conclusion is that differences in farm ownership structure among the member states could 
explain some differences in technology adoption.   
4. Supply of physical capital and other farm assets   
This section briefly reviews some general theoretical and practical aspects of supply of 
agricultural physical capital goods and other farm assets (agricultural land9 10). Because 
important agricultural production factors such as land is characterized by immobility, the 
                                                        
8 Swinnen and Gow (1999) discuss the role of these issues in the case of agricultural credit markets. 
9 We only briefly mention a few aspects related to the functioning of land markets. This topic is 
covered in other Deliverables such as 14.1, 14.2, 14.3 (for three candidate countries), 15.1 and 15.2.   
10 As noted in section 2.1, land is typically not viewed as physical capital according to its standard 
definition. 
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discussion separates between mobile and immobile farm assets. Farm machinery and 
equipment provide examples of production factors belonging to the former group, whereas 
land and buildings constitute immobile farm assets. Figure 2 attempts to summarize some 
market characteristics and price determinants (mainly on the supply side) for farm assets 
using the categorization described above. 
4.1 Mobile farm assets  
Farm machinery, such as harvesters, ploughs, combines and tractors, is a typical example of 
mobile as well as reproducible physical capital goods used in agricultural production. Also 
different types of equipment used at the farm belong to this category. In general, and in 
comparison to the immobile assets, the markets for the mobile physical capital goods may be 
said to be characterized by relatively liquid assets.   
In economic theory, supply is generally defined as “the quantity of a product that a producer 
is willing and able to supply onto the market at a given price in a given time period.” 
According to the Law of Supply, producers supply more of a good when the price of the good 
rises. In economic text books, this is typically illustrated graphically with an upward sloping 
supply curve that shows the relationship between price and quantity supplied (assuming that 
all other factors except price are held constant). The reasons behind the assumption of a 
positive relationship between the market price and quantity supplied typically include the 
following; First, when the market price rises (for example as a result of an increase in 
consumer demand), it becomes more profitable for firms to increase their output. Secondly, 
when output expands, a firm’s production costs rise (according to the law of diminishing 
returns to scale), and a higher price is needed to cover the higher average unit cost of 
production. A third reason is that higher prices may create an incentive for other firms to 
enter the market which in turn leads to an increase in supply.  
Several factors may cause a shift in supply, and thus causing an increase or decrease in the 
total amount supplied at a given price. The traditionally mentioned factors include changed 
costs of production, currency volatility, technological progress and government intervention 
(e.g. taxes and subsidies). Lower (higher) costs of production imply that more (less) can be 
supplied at a given price. A fall in the exchange rate causes an increase in the prices of 
imported production factors and will (assuming that all other factors remain at constant 
levels) lead to a decrease in supply. Changes in production technologies may imply changes 
(increases) in supply and lower prices for the buyer. Agriculture is typically characterized by 
strong knowledge intensity (technological progress). Shifts in supply are furthermore affected 
by governmental taxes and subsidies, such as support of energy saving technologies that 
stimulates its development and supply. Examples of further factors potentially affecting 
supply include purchasing powers on the demand side (e.g. agricultural cooperatives and 
other forms of cooperative arrangements that imply coordinated purchase of production 
factors), financial institutions and (imperfect) institutions and regulations.  
4.2 Immobile farm assets  
Agricultural land constitutes an immobile production factor used in agricultural production. 
As physical capital generally can be viewed as a complement to land in agricultural 
production, a farm’s access to agricultural land will influence its investments in physical 
capital. Other examples of immobile production factors in agriculture include buildings and 
different types of facilities used in the production that cannot be moved and typically are 
characterized by asset specificity (i.e. they have been constructed for a specific production 
purpose at the farm and has a low or non-existing resale value). Immobile capital goods can 
be either reproducible (such as buildings and facilities) or non-reproducible (land).  
The non-reproducibility of agricultural land implies that the quantity (measured by area) of 
existing agricultural land is fixed. It thereby differs from other capital goods used in 
agricultural production. Furthermore, as noted by Hurlburt (1958), agricultural land is two-
dimensional in its nature. That is, the quantity of land supplied is not only measured by 
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geographical area but also by physical quality (determined by factors such as soil quality and 
weather). Therefore, according to Hurlburt, the issue of defining effective supply of 
agricultural land is more complex than for other capital goods.11 
However, more relevant for land supply in modern European land markets are factors such 
as (imperfect) institutions and regulations which are discussed in other Deliverables. As is 
also discussed in other deliverables, a large share of land transfers within the member states 
takes place on the rental market. Further characteristics of land markets is that the total area 
of transferred land units each year only constitutes a small share of the total existing 
agricultural land and new land plots typically only become available on the market when 
existing firms quite. The latter imply that farms generally only can grow when other farms 
exit. However, in some member states further land market segments exist as a result of 
privatization of previously state-owned land. This is the case for the Central and Eastern 
European Countries were previously collectivized state-owned land are being privatized as a 
part of their economic transition (this is discussed in other deliverables such as 15.2). For 
example, the land market in Eastern Germany is influenced by its history of collectivized 
land. After the German reunification, an organization (the German Trustee Agency) was 
founded with the legal duty to privatize previously state owned agriculture and forestry 
property. Today, the Land Utilization and Administration Company (BVVG) have taken over 
this task in Eastern Germany and apply a public tendering procedure. Thus, individual farms 
may have the opportunity to acquire (buy or rent) new land through these privatization 
procedures.  
                                                        
11 Clearly, there are also several other reasons why the standard theory of supply do not apply to 
modern land markets.  
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Figure 2. Examples, market characteristics and some price determinants (mainly supply side) of mobile and immobile farm assets  
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5. Summary  
The overall aim of this Deliverable was to identify drivers of agricultural physical capital 
development. Physical capital is generally defined as an asset that is used in production 
which is manufactured by humans. Examples of physical capital assets in agricultural 
production include farm equipment, machinery and agricultural buildings.  
A review of some existing theories and modelling approaches related to physical capital 
adjustments showed that they have moved from being output based to approaches that 
consider, for example, irreversibility, uncertainty/risk and flexibility in the timing of 
investment. The aspects considered in the latter models (the new investment theory) should 
be relevant for investments in agriculture which are typically are characterized by large sunk 
investments costs and uncertainty in future returns. As is always the case with theoretical 
models, existing investment models consider one or a few aspects. They should therefore be 
viewed as complementary to each other in explaining investment behaviour. Particularly in 
the case of agricultural production, any change in the capital stock has to be seen in relation 
to other production factors, such as land and labour, which can be viewed as complements as 
well as substitutes to physical capital. This is especially the case for family farms which have a 
close links between farm and household.  
Investment decisions by agricultural firms can thus be expected to be driven by a large 
number of determinants, as well as being influenced by subjective beliefs and individual firm 
strategies. In this Deliverable, it was suggested that the drivers of physical capital 
adjustments in agriculture can be divided into three main groups, namely: i) expected (risk-
adjusted) profit, ii) expected societal benefits and costs, and iii) expected private non-
pecuniary benefits and costs. The discussion in this Deliverable mainly focused on the 
determinants related to the first group (expected profit) and covered aspects related to 
product market conditions, technological conditions, financial conditions and firm structure 
and organization. The second group refers, for example, to certain policies that may drive 
investment if they impose specific technological regulations (such as environmental 
regulations) and the third group relates to aspects such as  reputation or organizational 
legitimacy gained through compliance with higher quality standards or environmental 
regulations, which could drive capital adjustment.  
As physical capital generally can be viewed as a complement to land in agricultural 
production, a farm’s access to agricultural land will influence its investments in physical 
capital. Therefore, characteristics of land markets in the member states, including factors 
such as (imperfect) institutions and regulations which are discussed in other deliverables, 
will influence farms’ physical capital adjustments.  
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